The European Union (EU) requires member states to apply minimum taxes on manufactured cigarettes. One such tax has operated in Spain since 2006. This study evaluates the impact of this reform of the tax regime on manufactured cigarette prices and on smoking prevalence, drawing implications for European tobacco tax policy.
Methods: Quasi-experimental design with treatment and control territories. We analyzed series for prices before and after the reform and used cross-sectional health surveys to implement differences-in-differences estimators for smoking prevalence.
results: Under the minimum tax regime, prices increased three times faster in the treatment territory. However, the new regime did not affect smoking prevalence among males, either shortly after its enactment or 3 years hence. For women, we find no significant effects on prevalence in the short run, and point estimates ranging between −3.36% and −4.3% 3 years hence, although only one of these is statistically significant.
conclusions:
The new tax regime affected cigarette prices in the intended direction. However, we find only weak evidence for a reduction in prevalence among women. The availability of cheap, fine-cut tobacco appears to be the most likely cause for the poor results in terms of smoking prevalence. EU member states that have introduced a minimum tax on manufactured cigarettes might achieve little in terms of reductions in smoking prevalence if they allow a tax gap between fine-cut tobacco and manufactured cigarettes. In this sense, it is unfortunate that EU legislation consecrates a differential treatment for the two products.
intrOdUctiOn
The World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control exhorts parties to implement tax policies aimed at reducing tobacco consumption (World Health Organization, 2003, article 6, 2a) . As a signatory, the European Union (EU) has recently passed legislation (Council Directive CD 2011/64/EU) requiring member states to apply cigarette taxes to ensure that, as of January 01, 2014, at least 90 € per 1,000 units are excised as the sum of an ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax based on monetary value) and a specific tax (i.e., a tax based on physical quantity) regardless of brand or price category. Although the directive contains other remarkable requirements, such as setting thresholds for the share of specific tax as a proportion of average retail prices, the introduction of a minimum monetary duty applicable to all cigarette brands stands out as the type of regulation with more potential impact on smoking outcomes. Indeed, the existing literature (Chaloupka, Peck, Tauras, Xu, & Yurekli, 2010; Delipalla & Keen, 1992; Delipalla & O'Donnell, 2001) concurs that this is a tool that establishes a de facto price floor below which cigarettes would be sold at a loss, with effects akin to those of a specific tax on quantity and therefore constitutes a good practice from the point of view of tobacco control policy (IARC, 2011; PPACTE, 2012) .
Some member states anticipated the EU requirements and introduced this type of minimum duties on manufactured cigarettes before the publication of CD 2011/64/EU. Thus, although in 2005 only 14 of the current 27 member states applied them, the number increased to 19 by 2007, 20 by 2009, and 23 by 2012. The only member states that have not applied them to date are Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, but these are states where cigarette taxation has traditionally been biased toward specific taxes, with current rates rendering this particular directive requirement not binding.
In practice whether the steps taken by member states to transpose this directive requirement lead to higher cigarette prices and ultimately reductions in smoking is a research question that has attracted scarce attention to date. This article targets one of the research gaps that need to be addressed for Advance Access publication April 4, 2013 nicotine & tobacco research, volume 15, number 12 (december 2013) 1963-1970 a successful implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, namely "assessing the effectiveness of the existing tax structure in […] reducing tobacco use" (van Walbeek, Blecher, Gilmore, & Ross, 2013) . It does so by evaluating the effects of the introduction of a minimum tax on cigarettes in Spain, operating since February 2006, with a view to drawing useful implications for tobacco tax policy in the whole of the EU.
The evaluation of the causal impact of tax reforms on smoking outcomes in Spain over the decade of the 00s is hindered by concomitant developments in tobacco control policies during the period. For instance, Spain enacted a total ban at working places and a voluntary ban at bars and restaurants in 2005 (Galán et al., 2007; Galán & López, 2009; Jiménez-Ruiz et al., 2008; Nebot et al., 2009; Villalbí, 2009) . Nonetheless, although complying with Spanish tobacco regulations on advertising and consumption of tobacco products, the territory of the Canary Islands was, and still is, subject to a special tax regime aimed to stimulate their distant offshore economy. As a consequence, during our period of study, tobacco products in the Canary Islands did not bear the type of excise duties that were levied elsewhere in Spain. These differences in tax regimes provide a quasi-experiment (DiNardo, 2008) that affords the evaluation of the effects of the tax reforms of interest.
MethOds
It is useful to describe the main features of Spanish tobacco taxation in order to understand the characteristics of the quasiexperiment that provides the identification power for our study. In . Neither the introduction of the minimum nor its subsequent updates affected the territory of the Canary Islands. It is important to note also that within mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, there is no regional price variation in tobacco products. In fact, in these territories tobacco companies must notify price changes for their products to the Comisionado del Mercado de Tabaco (CMT, http://www.cmtabacos.es), a government agency in charge of regulating the retailing of tobacco products. These changes are then published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE, http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/). In contrast, within the Canary Islands, retailers are free to set prices.
We first examine the effect of the introduction of the minimum tax and its updates on cigarette prices comparing the Spanish National Series and the Canarian Regional Series for the consumption price index of tobacco products, both provided by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística , www.ine.es). As manufactured cigarettes have traditionally taken more than 90% of tobacco sales, these indices are good indicators of the dynamics in their average prices. A second source of information for the effect of the tax reforms in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands comes from the official price listings in the BOE mentioned above, from which we have compiled a panel dataset containing the prices of all cigarette brands on the first day of every month.
As for the effects of the reforms on prevalence, we will implement a differences-in-differences (DD) estimator (Abadie, 2008) that compares the differences in prevalence for the "treatment group" (mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands) before and after the "intervention" (the introduction of minimum taxes on cigarettes) with the difference in such outcome for the individuals in the "control group" (Canary Islands) before and after the intervention.
Our data sources for smoking prevalence are the National Health Surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Salud, ENS) for years 2001, 2003, and 2006 Because we have data for two different periods after the tax reform, we may consider different temporal comparisons. As the ENS 2006 data were collected between 4 and 16 months after the minimum tax was introduced in February 2006, the immediate or short-run effect can be estimated by the change in prevalence between the ENS 2003 and the ENS 2006. On the other hand, long-run effects might be estimated by the change in prevalence between the ENS 2003 and the EHS 2009. When interpreting the latter, it is useful to consider that the average value of the minimum tax during the sampling period of the ENS 2006 was 63.75 €/1,000 cigarettes, whereas the corresponding value for the sampling period of the EHS 2009 was 86.86 €/1,000 cigarettes. Therefore, not only is there a longer exposure period but also is the "dose" of the treatment greater than in the case of short-run effects.
We will first present estimates for raw DD computed as the change in prevalence before and after the tax reform for the treatment territory minus the change in prevalence before and after the tax reform in the control territory. As it is well known, these raw DD estimates need not correspond to the causal effect of the tax reform, for there could be other factors that generate differential dynamics in the outcomes across the two territories (Abadie, 2008) . Among these, the enactment of the smoking ban at workplaces mentioned earlier might have had heterogeneous effects depending on the fraction of smokers in indoor employment in each territory. Other factors that might generate heterogeneous trends in outcomes over time are related to the affordability-cost in relation to incomeof tobacco products or to the age structure of the population. The assumption of "common trends" (i.e., allowing for initial differences, prevalence in the control territory is a valid counterfactual for what would have occurred to prevalence in the treatment territory if the reform had not been applied) is more reasonable if such factors are accounted for. Likewise, statistical proof of common trends up to the date of the reform also lends credibility to this assumption (Abadie, 2008) .
Consequently, in addition to the raw DD estimates, we will also present estimates from regression models of the form (see Jones, Laporte, Rice, & Zucchelli, 2011; Huang & Chaloupka, 2012 for other application of similar regression models for smoking prevalence):
Where y i = 1 if individual i is a current smoker and 0 otherwise; T = {2003, 2006, 2009}; D it = 1 if individual i was sampled in period t and 0 otherwise; E i = 1 if individual i belongs to the treatment group (mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands) and 0 otherwise (i.e., individual i belongs to the control group Canary Islands); X i is a vector of binary variables signaling individual's i age group and gender; Z it is a vector of socioeconomic variables for individual's i region of residence at year t containing the unemployment rate, the fraction of employment in the primary sector, and the average wage; ε i is a random term assumed to follow a N(0,σ 2 ) distribution. Note that the omitted (default) year in the regression is 2001. The parameters of these regression models can be interpreted as the marginal effect on the probability that individual i smokes associated with the corresponding explanatory variable. They are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors with the package STATA 12. Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables intervening in the regressions.
The parameter vector β t , with t in T = {2003, 2006, 2009} captures a common time trend for both the treatment and the control groups (measured with respect to the omitted year 2001), whereas the parameter vector γ t allows for the possibility of uncommon trends between the two groups.
When estimating the short-run effects of the reform (i.e., the change in prevalence between the ENS 2003 and the ENS 2006), the parameter γ 2006 represents the portion of the differential prevalence between the treatment group and the control group in the post-intervention period that, under the hypothesis of common trends, might be interpreted as the causal effect of the intervention. This parameter is known as the average treatment effect (ATE) in the policy evaluation literature (Angrist, 2008) . The common trends hypothesis corresponds to the linear restriction γ 2003 = 0 in the context of our regression models. Correspondingly, under such hypothesis, the parameter γ 2009 represents the long-run effect defined above. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the price series in the two territories during the period 2000-2010, with 2006 as the reference year. Prior to 2006, the annual rate of increase of prices in both territories was quite similar (on average, 5% for mainland Spain and Balearic Islands and 6.2% for the Canary Islands), but from 2006 these figures differ sharply: 9.7% versus 2.6%, respectively. Indeed tobacco products became 44% more expensive between 2006 and 2010 in the intervention territory but only 10% more expensive in the control territory. These series reflect, of course, changes in nominal prices. If we take into account the effects of inflation over [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] 8 .3% and 8.5%, respectively, we find that there is a substantial increase in real prices in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands (35.7%) but a negligible one in the Canary Islands (1.5%). Moreover, the introduction of the minimum tax on cigarettes in February 2006 had an immediate effect on the distribution of cigarette prices in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands. As we observe in Figure 2 , the bottom end of the distribution of prices was lifted after February 2006. Also, the subsequent hikes to the minimum tax described earlier impacted on the distribution of cigarette prices, as Figure 3 shows. Note both the increase in real prices and the compression of the price distribution as the minimum tax increased over the period.
resUlts

Effects on Prices
These results are consistent with evidence from external sources that suggest a substantial divergence in the evolution of cigarette prices across the two territories. For instance, a pack of 20 Marlboros sold for 2.30 € in the Canaries and 2.35 in the Table 1 presents a summary of the results from our DD estimations. Panel A presents prevalence rates by survey year and gender for the two territories. Among women, these figures suggest a U-shaped curve in the case of the Canary Islands where prevalence falls in the first part of the decade but climbs back to 26.62% in 2009. In mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, female prevalence also falls in the first part of the decade but then stabilizes at around 24%. For men in the Canary Islands, there are substantial drops in prevalence at the start and at the end of the decade amounting to about 13% points, whereas in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, prevalence falls at the start of the decade and then stabilizes at around 35%.
Effects on Smoking Prevalence
Panel A also presents regional differences in smoking prevalence between the two territories by survey year. In the case of women, these are in general small, but in year 2009 the rate in the Canary Islands exceeds its counterpart by 2.10%. Nonetheless, this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The differences are greater in the case of men, but they are statistically significant only in year 2001, when the prevalence rate in the Canary Islands exceeded its counterpart by more than 6%.
Panel B presents the short-run effects of the minimum tax. First, panel B displays the temporal differences within each territory. Among these, we find a statistically significant reduction of 2.35% in the prevalence rate for males in the mainland territory, but the rest of changes are statistically not significant. Second, the panel presents the difference of the within-territory temporal differences (or DD). These are −2.23% and −2.44% for women and men, respectively. These point estimates would suggest that the introduction of the minimum tax led to a greater reduction in prevalence in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, but because their p values are far above the conventional levels, we cannot reject that these differences are null. The bottom of panel B, where the estimates from the regression model discussed earlier are presented, first displays the statistical test for the hypothesis of common trends. Note that this hypothesis cannot be rejected, so we may interpret the parameter γ 2006 as the ATE for the tax reform, whose estimate is presented along with the corresponding p value. Although the point estimate for the ATE on female prevalence would suggest that the reform caused a reduction of −1.5% in the mainland territory, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a null ATE for either gender. Panel C presents the long-run effects of the minimum tax. As in the case of the short-run effects, the only within-territory change in prevalence with statistical significance is found for males in Spain and the Balearic Islands. The difference-indifference point estimate for women is −3.36%, but again it lacks statistical significance (p = .20), as does the corresponding estimate of 3.49% for males (p = .37). As for the regression model estimates, we find ATEs of −4.3% for women and −3% for men. With a p value of .05, the former is statistically significant, but the latter is not (p = .27).
Altogether these estimates suggest that the minimum tax had no statistically significant effect on prevalence in the short period elapsed between its application in The absence of evidence for a short-run effect on prevalence is not wholly unexpected given the addictive nature of tobacco and the short time elapsed since the introduction of the minimum tax and the fielding of the ENS 2006. However, the lack of a robust effect on prevalence more than three years hence is surprising given the clear effect on cigarette prices that we have documented. Indeed, finding a statistically significant effect on prevalence only for females and, even then, with only one of our estimation methods, runs against the well established notion that smoking prevalence responds to price rises (Chaloupka, Straif, & Leon, 2011) and begs the question of what happened in the Spanish tobacco market that might explain so.
Previous evidence from aggregate data shows that the price of fine-cut tobacco for use in roll-your-own cigarettes fell in real terms between 2005 and 2008 and has remained well below that of manufactured cigarettes (adjusting for weight equivalence), with the share of fine-cut tobacco over total tobacco sales more than trebling (from 1.6% to 5.1% of sales), over the period 2005 -2011 (López-Nicolás et al., 2012 . These changes at the aggregate level suggest that the potential effects on smoking prevalence of minimum cigarette taxes might have been dampened by a switch from manufactured cigarettes to hand-rolled cigarettes. Among the data sources that we have analyzed, only the European Health Survey of 2009 contains information on the use of hand-rolled cigarettes, so it is not possible to track changes in the patterns of consumption over time across the two territories. Nonetheless, the EHS 2009 shows that although in the Canary Islands the proportion of smokers using hand-rolled cigarettes (alone or in combination with other tobacco products) is negligible, in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands, it reaches 7.74% among men and 5.08% among women. This would be consistent with a process of taking up hand-rolled cigarettes induced by the increase in the cost of manufactured cigarettes that we have documented before. Also, the finding of a significant drop in prevalence among women in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands with one of our estimations is consistent with their somewhat smaller rate of use of hand-rolled cigarettes in relation to men according to the EHS 2009.
discUssiOn
The introduction of the minimum tax on manufactured cigarettes in February 2006 in mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands and its subsequent hikes do not seem to have affected smoking prevalence among males, either shortly after the reform or 3 years hence. In the case of women, we find no significant effects in the short run and point estimates ranging between 3.36% and 4.3% in the long run, although only one of these is statistically significant at conventional levels. We have argued that these patterns are consistent with a process of switching to hand-rolled cigarettes, especially among males, in concomitance with the marked increase in the price of manufactured cigarettes resulting from the minimum taxes.
In this sense, the new tax regime has performed poorly in regard of the public health objective of "reducing (tobacco) consumption" stated in the preamble of the enacting Royal Decree (BOE, 2006) . It seems that a necessary condition to achieve such reduction would have been to plug the tax loophole that allowed to market fine-cut tobacco at a substantive discount with respect to manufactured cigarettes. Although some steps have been taken to address this problem recently (see López-Nicolás et al., 2012) , the tax burden on fine-cut tobacco in the Spanish market is still much smaller in "cigarette equivalent terms" than that on manufactured cigarettes. Assuming a conservative rate of 0.7 g of fine-cut tobacco per roll (Laugesen et al., 2009) , the current tax of 80 € per kg of fine-cut tobacco should be increased up to 170 € to equate the tax of 119.1 € per 1,000 manufactured cigarettes in force at the time of writing this article.
As for the EU wide implications that motivate this article, there is a relevant policy message implied by our results. The countries that have introduced a minimum tax on manufactured cigarettes, in transposition of the corresponding requirement in CD 2011/64/EU, might achieve little in terms of reductions in smoking prevalence if they allow a tax gap between fine-cut tobacco and manufactured cigarettes. In this sense, it is unfortunate that this directive actually consecrates a differential treatment for the two products. First, although the directive imposes a minimum combined tax of 90 € per 1,000 manufactured cigarettes (article 10), for fine-cut tobacco it requires (article 14) member states to apply a minimum combined tax amounting to either 47 € per kg or 46% of the average price of all fine-cut tobacco products (these rates will gradually scale up to 60 € and 50%, respectively, by 2020). Therefore, the principle of taxing quantity, rather than value, is not preserved in this rule. Second, even if the choice of taxing the value of fine-cut tobacco did not exist, the minimum rate on quantity is (and will still be by 2020) far below the corresponding rate on manufactured cigarettes. Indeed, using the equivalence of 0.7 g per roll, 90 € per 1,000 manufactured cigarettes would require 128.57 € per kg of fine-cut tobacco to achieve an equal burden. It is up to the member states to design their own taxes in a way such that the asymmetries allowed by EU legislation are overcome. The evidence presented in this article suggests that member states should be proactive in this regard if they want to successfully implement the Framework Convention guidelines on taxation. 
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